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RECENT CASES
WATER AND WATER COURSES-SURFACE WATERS-RIGHTS OF A LAND-
OWNER TO DRAIN-Plaintiff brought an action against a neigh-
boring property owner for damages caused by drainage of surface
waters onto his property. The defendant then instituted third-party
proceedings against the architect-engineer who planned and super-
vised construction of the works and who expressly agreed to assume
responsibility for all acts of negligence and damage growing out
of and from this construction which changed the direction of the
surface waters. The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the
plaintiff could recover damages based on its finding that the plain-
tiff's property was flooded as a result of the construction, and the
architect-engineer did nothing to prevent the flooding after being
warned of the dangers by the plaintiff. The Court states that it
now adopts the reasonable use rule in regard to the drainage of
surface waters. Jones v. Boeing Company, 153 N.W.2d 897 (N.D.
1967).
As North Dakota is an agriculturally oriented state the prob-
lem of rights and liabilities of landowners in regard to surface
water drainage is an often occurring one. It is the purpose of this
casenote to discuss the various rules concerning surface water
drainage and specifically the rule adopted by North Dakota.
The term surface water was been defined by many courts and
the definitions are far from uniform. A simple definition is water
collected on the surface of the ground,' but a more comprehensive
definition, often used, is water from rains, springs, or melting snow
which lie or flow on the surface of the earth but which do not form
a part of a well-defined body of water or natural watercourse.2
Water which is considered surface water continues to be such until
it reaches a channel or watercourse3 or percolates through the
ground. 4 Interference with surface water has been the subject of
1. Ramsey v. Ketcham, 78 Ind.App. 200, 127 N.E. 204, 205 (1920).
2. E.g., Collins v. Wickland, 251 Minn. 419, 88 N.W.2d 83, 87 (1958) ; Sun Under-
writers Ins. Co. of New York v. Bunkley, 233 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. Civil App. 1950); Gray
v. Reclamation Dist. No. 1500, 174 Cal. 622, 163 P. 1024, 1036 (1917) ; RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 846 (1939).
3. E.g., County of Scotts Bluff v. Hartwig, 160 Neb. 823, 71 N.W.2d 507, 511 (1955);
Schomberg v. Kuther, 153 Neb. 413, 45 N.W.2d 129, 137 (1950).
4. E.g., Everett v. Davis, 18 Cal.2d 389, 115 P.2d 821, 823 (1941).
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many lawsuits and the courts have promulgated three widely di-
vergent views as to the effect or liability resulting from such inter-
ference. Each of these views will be discussed in some detail in
the material that follows.
The common law or "common enemy view" sets forth the propo-
sition that surface water will be regarded as a common enemy and
each landowner may take any measures deemed necessary to protect
his land from damage. 5 Under this rule a landowner has the right
to lawfully obstruct or hinder the natural flow of surface water
and he may turn water off his land onto or over his neighbor's
property without being held liable for so doing.6 An obvious problem
with the adoption of a rule such as this is that it could promote
embankment building or drainage contests between neighbors which
would be detrimental to the organized development of proper drain-
age and land use. A Texas court has aptly described the common
enemy rule as one having no support of law or reason as it is a rule
of force rather than common justice.
7
The civil law theory promulgates the view that the control of
surface water is governed by the law of nature and therefore
the lower landowner is bound to receive the surface water which
naturally flows from the land above. 8 This view seems to allow
the upper landowner an easement over the property of the lower
landowner and the jurisdictions following this view justify it by
stating that one who purchases or otherwise acquires land should
expect and be required to accept it subject to the burdens of
natural drainage. 9 The civil law view has some rather serious
pitfalls if it is strictly interpreted. This is pointed out by the fact
that strict adherence to the principle upon which it is founded,
namely, " . . .water flows, and as it flows, so it ought to flow,"' 10
would seem to prohibit any drainage improvements on one's land.
This would be a logical extension because any drainage improve-
ments would necessarily affect the natural water flow, thus violating
the civil law theory.
The third and, in this writer's opinion, best theory is that of
reasonable use. The sum and substance of the rule is set forth
in a New Jersey case as follows:
• . . [E]ach possessor is legally privileged to make a
reasonable use of his land, even though the flow of sur-
face waters is altered thereby and causes some harm to
5. E.g., Soules v. Northern Pac. Ry. 34 N.D. 7, 157 N.W. 823, 826 (1916).
6. Walker v. New Mexico & Southern Pac. R.R. 165 U.S. 593, 604 (1877).
7. Miller v. Letzerich, 121 Tex. 248, 49 S.W.2d 404, 411 (1932).
8. Soules v. Northern Pac. Ry. supra note 5, at 826.
9. La Fleur v. Kolda, 71 S.D. 162, 22 N.W.2d 741, 744 (1946).
10. Vinson v. Turner, 252 Ala. 271, 40 So.2d 863, 864 (1949).
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others, but [the landowner] incurs liability when his harm-
ful interference with the flow of surface waters is unrea-
sonable.11
The point of contention in jurisdictions following this view revolves
around what is, or is not, a reasonable use and this must be deter-
mined on the facts of each case.1
2
In the instant case the Supreme Court absolutely adopts the
reasonable use view for North Dakota after having been classified
as adhering to the common enemy doctrine since Henderson v.
Hines's was decided in 1921. In the instant case the Court states:
We believe the reasonable use rule . .. has been well stated
and that it represents not so much a change in policy by
this court as a clarification of the rationale followed in prior
decisions and that the result reached is a similar one.14
An analysis of the North Dakota cases concerning surface waters
indicates that the above statement is a most accurate appraisal of
the situation. An early North Dakota case, prior to Henderson, held
that, as pertains to surface waters, "... one shall not so use his
own property as to injure another.
An analysis of Henderson will certainly not uphold the idea that
North Dakota had adopted the strict common enemy rule. The fact
is that the court stated: ". . . [H]e [the landowner] has the
right to possess, use, and enjoy his land subject to the principle,
'sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.' "'I, which, as mentioned
earlier, means one should use his property so as not to harm others.
It would seem that, in effect, the North Dakota Court adopted
either the reasonable use view or a very modified concept of the
common enemy theory in Henderson. The reasoning behind this
conclusion is that if one must use his property so as not to harm
others it necessarily follows that he may not dam up or drain away
surface waters as he wishes because his actions may harm a neigh-
boring parcel of land. This, therefore, differs from the strict common
enemy theory which gives every landowner the right to dam up
and drain away surface waters as he wishes without liability.
Because of the restriction attached to the common enemy theory,
by the Court in the Henderson case, it appears that North Dakota
11. Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4, 8 (1956).
12. E.g., Enderson v. Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163, 82 N.W.2d 286, 289 (1948).
13. 48 N.D. 152, 183 N.W. 531 (1921).
14. Jones v. Boeing Co., 153 N.W.2d 897, 904 (1967).
15. Carrol v. Rye Tp., 13 N.D. 458, 101 N.W. 894, 897 (1904), the phrase is derived
from the Latin Maxim "Sic Utere Tuo ut Alienun Non Laedas." See also Lemer v. Koble,
86 N.W.2d 44, 46 (N.D. 1957).
16. Henderson v. Hines supra note 18, at 535.
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has, in effect, followed the reasonable use view rather than the
strict common enemy rule. It can logically be said that North
Dakota has followed the reasonable use theory since the "sic utere"
principle was set forth in the Rye case in 1904. The language of
the reasonable use doctrine is present in several other North Dakota
surface water cases prior to the instant case. In Rynestad v.
Clemetson17 the court stated:
Subject to certain restrictions, and provided he acts reason-
ably and with prudent regard for the interests of adjacent
owners so as not to increase the burden on the lower owner
or injure his property, the upper owner may artificially drain
his land.18 (emphasis added)
In a 1967 case the court stated:
We see no reason why the general rule which fixes the mu-
tual and reciprocal rights and liabilities of adjoining land-
owners under the maxim sic utere . . ., requiring that each
use and maintain his own land in a reasonable manner ....
should not apply... [to the facts in this case.] 19 (emphasis
added)
Even though this writer feels North Dakota has, in effect,
followed the reasonable use theory for many years the fact remains
that the court has removed all doubt by specifically adopting it in
the instant case and it would be useful to investigate what concepts
will be important for litigants under this theory. As has been stated
earlier, the determination of whether or not the action of the land-
owner is reasonable or not will depend on the facts and circum-
stances of each case. Thus it would behoove every landowner to
thoroughly scrutinize the facts and attempt to determine the reason-
ability of the action of the various participants before starting a
drainage project.
Minnesota has also adopted the reasonable use theory and the
Minnesota Supreme Court has set forth a test which, if followed
by the landowner, will allow the landowner the right to drain his
land of surface waters even if it creates a burden on the land of the
lower owner. The Minnesota test allows drainage of surface waters
if the following factors are present:
a) There is a reasonable necessity for such drainage;
b) If reasonable care be taken to avoid unnecessary injury
to the land receiving the burden;
17. 133 N.W.2d 559 (N.D. 1965).
18. Id. at 563. The Court was using 93 C.J.S. Waters § 116 as authority for this state-
ment.
19. Roder V. Krom, 150 N.W.2d 708, 710 (N.D. 1967).
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c) If the utility or benefit accruing to the land drained reason-
ably outweighs the gravity of the harm resulting to the
land receiving the burden; and
d) If, where practicable, it is accomplished by reasonably
improving and aiding the normal and natural system of
drainage according to its reasonable carrying capacity, or
if, in the absence of a practicable natural drain, a reasonable
and feasible artificial drainage system is adopted.20
The above reasonability test set down in Minnesota would at
least give a North Dakota landowner some idea of what drainage
measures he may take, under the reasonable use theory, without
incurring liability.
Even though North Dakota has the reasonable use doctrine as
to surface waters, the landowner must know the distinction between
surface waters and waters of a natural watercourse and the dis-
tinction is often not easily discernable.21 The distinction is important
because a natural watercourse cannot be interfered with under any
of the mentioned doctrines.2 2 The problems entailed in determining
what is a natural watercourse is beyond the scope of this casenote,
however, a starting point for one who wishes to pursue the makeup
of a watercourse is the definition in the NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY
CODE which is as follows:
A watercourse entitled to the protection of the law is con-
stituted if there is a sufficient natural and accustomed flow
of water to form and maintain a distinct and defined
channel. It is not essential that the supply of water should
be continuous or from a perennial living source. It is enough
if the flow arises periodically from natural causes and
reaches a plainly defined channel of permanent character.
2 3
In conclusion it should be pointed out that it would seem to
be very difficult to promulgate one specific rule concerning drainage
of surface water in North Dakota because of the varied topography
of the state which includes the rolling hills of the west and the
very level Red River Valley in the east. It is, however, extremely
important that landowners know what rights they have in regard
to drainage of surface waters as well planned drainage is essential
20. Enderson v. Kelehan supra note 12, at 289.
21. The court stated that a natural drainway was involved and it was settled law that
drainways must be kept open and furthermore they were in no particular hurry to choose
a surface water rule because of the peculiar topography and climatic conditions of the
state. Soules v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 34 N.D. 7, 157 N.W. 823 (1916). See also Rei-
chert v. Northern Pacific Ry. 39 N.D. 114, 167 N.W. 127, 136 (1918).
22. E.g., Lemer, supra note 15, at 46; Soules, supra note 5; Aldritt v. Fleischauer, 74
Neb. 66, 103 N.W. 1084, 1086 (1905).
28. N.D. CET. CoD § 61-01-06 (1960).
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to good husbandry in an agricultural state and much land can be
made more productive as a result of proper drainage.
Because the application of the reasonable use doctrine depends
on the facts of each case that comes before the court it can be
effectively used in all parts of the state, thus the North Dakota
Supreme Court has followed the best suited doctrine for North Dakota.
DAVID L. PETERSON
DAMAGES-GROWING CROPS-MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR INJURY
TO GROWING CROPs-The appellant appealed a judgment in favor
of the respondent based on claims for damages for the county's
negligent spraying of weed killer onto their tomato crops. The
appellant contends that the trial court did not use the proper
measure of damages in measuring the respondent's loss, claiming
that the proper measure of damages for partial destruction of growing
crops is "the difference between the market value of the crop
destroyed and the cost of producing the crop." The California court
held, in rejecting this measure and based upon the rule in Rystrom
v. Sutter Butte Canal Co.,' that the estimated costs of production
must first be deducted from expected gross receipts to arrive at
the expected net profit. Next, actual costs of production must be
deducted from actual receipts to arrive at actual net profit. Finally,
deducting actual net profit from expected net profit fixes the actual
damage.2 Solis v. County of Contra Costa, 60 Cal. Rptr. 99 (Ct.
App. 1967).
The Rystrom case,3 an action for damages in contract, relies
on Treller v. Bay River Dredging Co., 4 where the court approved
a measure similar to that in Rystrom.
The court stated:
In cases of destruction of growing crops it is proper and
important to introduce and admit evidence showing the kind
of crops the land is capable of producing, the kind of crops
destroyed, the average yield per acre of each kind on land
not destroyed, and on similar lands in the immediate neigh-
borhood, cultivated in like manner, the stage of growth of
the crops at the time of injury or destruction, the expenses
1. 72 Cal.App. 618, 249 P. 53 (1925). Action by plaintiff to recover damages for loss
of crops due to the alleged failure of defendant to furnish water for irrigation purposes
during the years 1921 and 1922 as provided by contract.
2. Id. at 55.
a. Supra note i.
4. Teller v. Bay & River Dredging Co., 151 Cal.App. 209, 90 P. 942 (1907).
